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Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. 
Board of Equalization of California: 
STATE SALES AND USE TAX ON 
REUGIOUS MATERIAL IS NOT 
VIOlATIVE OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT'S REliGION ClAUSES 
In Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. 
Board of Equalization of California, 
110 S. Ct. 688 (1990), the United States 
Supreme Court held the the imposition 
of California's general sales and use tax 
on religious materials sold and distrib-
uted by a religious organization was not 
prohibited under the First Amendment's 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. 
The Court cautioned, however, that its 
t1ndings were limited to the particular tax 
at hand, and that similar taxes imposed 
on religious materials could very well 
constitute a constitutionally Significant 
burden on religious practices and beliefs. 
Appellant, Jimmy Swaggert Ministries, 
is a religious organization incorporated as 
a Louisiana nonprotlt organization and 
recognized as such by the Internal Reve-
nue Service. Its purpose, as set forth in its 
constitution and by-laws, is to "estab-
lish[] and maintain[] an evangelistic out-
reach for the worship of Almighty God." 
Id. at 691. In fulfilling this purpose, the 
organization regularly conducts evange-
listic crusades across the nation, at which 
it sells and distributes certain religious 
and nonreligious items. The organization 
also publishes and distributes nationwide 
a monthly magazine, "The Evangelist," 
which contains advertisements for sale-
able religious and nonreligious items 
with corresponding mail-order forms. Id. 
at 691-92. 
Under California law, retailers are re-
quired to pay a 6% sales tax on all tangible 
personal property sold within the state. 
In addition, out-of-state retailers selling 
tangible personal property to California 
residents are reqUired to collect from said 
purchasers a 6% use tax. During the tax 
period from 1974 through 1981, Appel-
lant failed to pay the applicable sales and 
use taxes on religiOUS items it sold to 
California residents. In 1980, the Board 
of Equalization of California informed Ap-
pellant that sales of religious materials 
were not exempt from tax. The follow-
ing year, the Board audited Appellant and 
advised it to register as a seller and report 
and pay all taxes accruing from sales it 
made through mail-orders in California 
and at its California crusades. The Board 
estimated that Appellant earned 
$1,702,942.00 from mail order sales and 
$240,560.00 from crusade merchandise 
sales during the tax period. Based on 
these figures, the Board assessed 
$118,294.54 for sales and use taxes, an 
additional $36,021.11 in interest, and a 
penalty of $11,829.45, totalling 
$166,145.10 owed by Appellant. 
Appellant filed a petition for redeter-
mination with the Board, asserting that 
the State's imposition of tax liability on 
the sale of religious materials violated the 
first amendment. On review, the Board 
deleted the penalty originally assessed, 
but otherwise held that the Appellant 
was liable for the adjusted amount plus 
interest. Pursuant to state procedural 
law, the Appellant paid the taxes and 
filed for a refund, which the Board sub-
sequently denied. Appellant then filed 
suit in state court which entered judg-
ment for the Board. The California Court 
of Appeals affirmed the lower court de-
cision, and the California Supreme Court 
denied discretionary review. The United 
States Supreme Court noted probable ju-
risdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1257 
(2). 
Before the Supreme Court, Appellant 
argued that the imposition of the State's 
sales and use tax on religious materials 
contravenes both the Free Exercise and 
the Establishment Clauses of the First 
Amendment. Appellant also asserted that 
the imposition of the State's use tax was 
violative of the Commerce and Due Pro-
cess Clauses. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, limited its review strictly to 
Appellant's first amendment assertions 
and declined to address the merits ofthe 
remaining claim for procedural reasons. 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment prohibits a state or federal 
legislative body from exerting any re-
straint on the free exercise of religion. 
Id. at 693. In deciding whether the State's 
imposition of tax was valid under the 
Free Exercise Clause, the Court stated 
the the appropriate inquiry is "whether 
[the] government has placed a substan-
tial burden on the observation of a central 
religiOUS belief or practice and, if so, 
whether a compelling governmental in-
terest justifies the burden." Id. (quoting 
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 
680, 699 (1989». The Appellant in the 
case sub judice, thereby asserted that 
"the State's imposition of use and sales 
tax liability on it burden[ed] its evangeli-
cal distribution of religiOUS materials. 
.. ," relying heavily on Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) and Follett 
v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). Id. 
In Murdock, the Supreme Court re-
versed the convictions of Jehovah's 
witnesses who were arrested for distrib-
uting religious material without a license, 
in violation of a city ordinance which 
required that all persons canvassing or 
soliciting procure a license by paying a 
flat fee. The Court struck down the ordi-
nance as unconstitutional because the 
license tax imposed was "levied and col-
lected as a condition to the pursuit of 
activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed 
by the First Amendment [since] ... it 
restrains in advance those constitu-
tionalliberties of press and religion and 
inevitably tends to suppress their exer-
cise. "Jimmy Swaggert Ministries, 110 S. 
Ct. at 694 (quoting Murdock, 321 U.S. at 
113-14 (emphasis added». Similarly in 
Follett, the Supreme Court invalidated an 
ordinance which required all booksellers 
to procure a license to sell books by 
paying a flat fee. Again, this particular tax 
was deemed unconstitutional because it 
acted as a prior restraint on constitution-
ally protected religious conduct. Despite 
this conclUSion, however, the Court cau-
tioned that "a preacher is not 'free from 
all financial burdens of government, in-
cluding taxes on income or property' 
and, 'like other citizens, may be subject 
to general taxation. ", Id. at 694 (quoting 
Follett, 321 U.S. at 578). 
In the case sub judice, the Court deter-
mined that Appellant's reliance on the 
aforementioned case law was misplaced. 
In its reasoning, the Court noted that 
although Appellant's religious exercise 
deserves a high claim to constitutional 
protection, it nevertheless has not been 
significantly burdened by a "general" 
sales and use tax that does not operate as 
a prior restraint, and which "'is not a flat 
tax, represents only a small fraction of a 
retail sale, and applies neutrally to all 
retail sales of tangible personal property 
made in California." Jimmy Swaggert 
Ministries 110 S. Ct. at 695 (emphasis 
added). Moreover, the Court stated that 
the registration requirement under Cali-
fornia law did not act as a prior restraint 
because it required no prepayment of a 
fee and the tax was due regardless of 
preregistration. Id.at 696 (see Cal. Rev. & 
Tax Code Ann. §§ 606674(West 1987 & 
Supp. 1989». The Court, therefore, con-
cluded that the general sales and use tax 
at issue was more akin to a generally 
applicable income or property tax, and 
thus did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Admendment. 
Appellant also argued that the general 
tax imposed a significant burden on its 
exercise of religious beliefs because the 
tax and costs associated with administer-
ing it greatly reduced Appellant's income 
by lowering the demand for wares 
caused by the marginally higher price. 
However, relying onHernandezv. Com-
missioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (holding 
that the Government's disallowance of a 
tax deduction for religiOUS "auditing" and 
"training" services did not violate the 
Free Exercise Clause), the court stated 
that "any such burden is not constitution-
ally significant." Jimmy Swaggert Minis-
tries, 110 S. Ct. at 696. Recognizing that 
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Appellant incurred sorne cost in cornply-
ing with the generally applicable sales 
and use tax, the Court noted that Appel-
lant is no rnore burdened by the imposi-
tion of such tax than it is by other 
generally applicable regulations, such as 
health and safety regulations, with which 
Appellant already cornplies. Id 
In its next argument, the Appellant 
contended that under Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the irnposi-
tion of the sales and use tax was violative 
of the Establishment Clause in that it 
"foster [ ed] 'an excessive government en-
tanglernent with religion' ... [by requir-
ing] on-site inspections of appellant's 
evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site au-
dits, examinations of appellant's books 
and records, threats of criminal prosecu-
tion, and layers of administrative and ju-
dicial proceedings." Id at 697 (quoting 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613). In addressing 
this contention, the Court focused on 
whether the imposition of the tax re-
sulted in an "excessive 'involvernent be-
tween appellant and the State and' 
continuing surveillance leading to an im-
permissible degree of entanglernent," as 
provided under Walz v. Tax Comm'n of 
New York City, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); 
Jimmy Swaggert Ministries, 110 S. Ct. at 
698. In holding that the spirit and values 
of the Establishment Clause were not 
even rernotely at issue in this case, the 
Court noted that 
the [tax] statutory scherne requires 
neither the involvernent of state ern-
ployees in, nor on-site continuing 
inspection of, appellant's day-to-day 
operations ... [and] [rn]ost signifi-
cantly, [it] does not require the State 
to inquire into the religious content 
of the items sold or the religious 
rnotivation for selling or purchasing 
the iterns, because the rnaterials are 
subject to the tax regardless of con-
tent or rnotive. 
[d. at 699. Furtherrnore, the Court re-
jected Appellant's assertion that the col-
lection and payrnent of the tax irnposed 
upon it a severe accounting burden. 
The Court stated that this allegation was 
clearly unsupported by the record 
which showed that any such burden 
was signillcantly eased by Appellant's 
sophisticated accounting staff and corn-
puterized accounting systern. Even if 
substantial, the Court added that such 
record-keeping and adrninistrative bur-
dens do not rise to a constitutionally 
signillcant level. Id. at 698. 
Finally, the Appellant asserted that the 
use tax imposition violated the Com-
rnerce and Due Process Clauses because 
of and insufficient "nexus" between the 
-State and itself as an out-of-state retailer. 
The Court, however, refused to address 
the rnerits of this claim due to the fact 
that the claim was procedurally barred 
under California state law. Therefore, the 
Court concluded that the claim was not 
properly before it. 
1bis case is Significant in that it ad-
dresses a classical first adrnendrnent issue 
pertaining to religion and the free exer-
cise thereof, yet adapts it to a rnore rnod-
ernistic view. Today, rnore and rnore 
evangelists are thernselves excessively 
entangling religious and commercial acti-
vities, thereby making it difficult to dis-
tinguish between the two. However, the 
Suprerne Court has atternpted to rernedy 
this confusion by upholding tax imposi-
tions on the sale of both religious and 
non-religious rnaterials; the determina-
tive test being whether the tax can be 
neutrally irnposed regardless of content, 
whether it acts as a prior restraint on 
religious liberty, and whether any State 
activities in imposing the tax can rernain 
detached and neutral frorn the religiOUS 
organization itself. 
-Cathy A. Cooper 
Ta.Dlin v. Levitt: STATE COURT 
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL RICO 
ClAIMS NOT PREEMPTED 
In Tafflin v. Levitt, 110 S. Ct. 792 
(1990), the United States Suprerne Court 
detennined that state courts have con-
current juri diction over civil actions 
brought under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 
18 U.S.c. §§ 1961.{)8. 
Following the failure of Old Court Sav-
ings & Loan, Inc. (hereinafter "Old 
Court"), the petitioners, non-residents of 
Maryland holding unpaid certificates of 
deposit issued by Old Court, instituted an 
action in federal district court against the 
respondents, fonner officers and direc-
tors of Old Court, the Maryland Savings-
Share Insurance Corporation 
(hereinafter "MSSIC"), fonner officers 
and directors of MSSIC, Old Court and 
MSSIC's law finn, and Old Court's ac-
counting firrn. In the cornplaint, the Pe-
titioners alleged several state law claims, 
a clairn under the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 (herinafter "Ex-
change Act"), and a civil claim under 
RICO. The Respondents ftled a Motion to 
Dismiss which was granted by the dis-
trict court for two reasons. First, the dis-
trict court granted the Respondent's 
rnotion concluding that the Petitioners 
failed to state a claim under the Exchange 
Act. The district court also determined 
that the Petitioners' civil RICO claims 
would be disposed of in a pending state 
court action. Because the district court 
belived that state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over these claims, it deter-
mined that federal abstention was 
appropiate. The district court ruling was 
afflrrned by the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Tafflin v. Leritt, 865 F.2d 
595( 4th Cir. 1989). The Suprerne Court 
granted certiorari solely for the purpose 
of determining whether a state court has 
concurrent jurisdiction over civil RICO 
claims. 
In reaching its decision, the Suprerne 
Court began by ernphasizing the deep 
rooted presumption in favor of concur-
rent state court jurisdiction. This pre-
sumption is rebuttable only upon a 
showing that: (1) there is an explicit 
congressional statute granting exclusive 
federal court jurisdiction; (2) there is an 
unmistakable implication frorn legisla-
tive history dernonstrating Congressional 
intent to grant exclusive jurisdiction to 
the federal courts; or (3) there is a clear 
incornpatibility between state court juris-
diction and federal interests. Tafflin, 110 
S. Ct. at 795 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. 
v. Mobile Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 
(1981». 
Applying the Gulf Offshore factors, 
the Court rejected the idea that state 
courts have been divested of jurisdiction 
over civil RICO actions "by an explicit 
statutory directive." Id. at 795, (quoting 
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 478). Further, 
as the Petitioners conceded, there was 
no express language in RICO granting 
exclusive federal juridiction over civil 
RICO claims. The jurisdictional grant in 
RICO provides: "[a]ny person injured in 
his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962 of this chapter 
may sue therefor [sic] in any appropriate 
United States district court .... " [d. at 
796 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 1964(c» (ern-
phasis in orginal). The Court found 
Congress' use of "rnay" in RICO presuas-
ive and noted that "[i]t is black letter law 
... that the rnere grant of juridiction to a 
federal court does not operate to oust a 
state court frorn concurrent jurisdiction 
over the cause of action." [d. (quoting 
Gulf0jfshore, 453 U.S. at 479). Accord-
ingly, the Court found the grant offederal 
jurisdiction over RICO cases to be per-
missive, not rnandatory. Id. 
Next, the Court considered the legisla-
tive history of RICO . The Court found no 
evidence that Congress considered the 
question of concurrent state court juris-
diction over civil RICO claims, rnuch less 
any suggestion of congressional intent to 
confer exclusive jurisdiction on the fed-
eral courts. The Petitioners posed two 
argurnents. First they contended that if 
Congress had addressed the issue it 
would have granted the federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction. The Court re-
jected this argument refusing to specu-
late as to Congress' intent. [d. 
Alternatively, the Petitioners relied on 
dicta in Sedima, S.P.R. V.L v. Imrex Co., 
473 u.s. 479 (1985) andAgen0' Holding 
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